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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court to hear 
this appeal by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3)(j), 1953 as 
amended. This statute sets forth the Utah Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any 
court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction." The nature of this proceeding 
is an appeal from a final order of Second District Court, the 
Honorable Rodney S. Page, in and for Davis County, State of utah. 
The order of that Court found North Salt Lake City's breed specific 
vicious dog law to be constitutionally valid. There is no grant 
of original appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals as would 
be applicable to this case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that North Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 13-20-16E was not vague and violative of 
substantiative due process, as measured by constitutional 
standards? 
II. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the North 
Salt Lake Ordinance does not violate constitutional standards of 
equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and violate Aritcle I, Section 24 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
III. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the 
1 
evidence established that predominant physical characteristics are 
determinative of breed differentiation in the species of dog? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT XIV, 
Section 1, [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the uNited States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of hte laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION 24: 
[Uniform operation of law.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In January, 1987, the City Council of Defendant-Respondent, 
North Salt Lake (hereinafter "North Salt Lake") adopted the North 
Salt Lake Animal Control Ordinance, chapter 13-20-1, et seg. The 
ordinance was thereafter amended in August, 1987, to include the 
American Pit Bull Terrier as a specified breed, and as well, to 
include an administrative remedy provision. 
On or about February 3, 1987, Kate Greenwood, Andrew 
Greenwood, Ralph Greenwood and American Dog Breeders Association 
filed suit against North Salt Lake City in response to certain 
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breed specific portions of the afore-mentioned animal control 
ordinance. The substance of the Plaintiffs-Appellants1 
(hereinafter "Greenwoods") claims were that the ordinance 
constituted a "taking" of property without due process of law, that 
the ordinance denied equal protection of the laws, that the 
ordinance was too vague and ambiguous to be enforceable, and that 
the ordinance bore no rational relationship to its objective, all 
in violation of Greenwoods1 constitutional rights. 
The particular language of the North Salt Lake animal control 
ordinance, as was made subject of this lawsuit, is as follows: 
Section 13-20-1: DEFINITIONS 
"22. VICIOUS ANIMAL: Any animal which is dangerously 
aggressive or uncontrollable, including but not 
limited to, any animal which has bitten or in any 
other manner attacked any person or animal. Any 
animal by its unique nature or breeding has known 
propensities to be aggressive towards any person or 
animal." 
Section 13-20-16: 
"A. PREMISES, MUZZLE: It shall be unlawful for the 
owner of any fierce, dangerous, or vicious animal 
to permit such animal to go or be off the premises 
of the owner unless such animal is under restraint 
and properly muzzled as to prevent it from injuring 
any person or property." 
"E. HEREDITY CHARACTERISTICS: Certain breeds of dogs 
which by their unique hereditary characteristics, 
owner, training, and instruction, or mistreatment 
has a propensity to be vicious. These breeds 
include, but are not limited to, the Bull Terrier, 
the American Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire 
Terrier, Staffordshire [sic] Bull Terrier, American 
Pit Bull Terrier, Tosa, Shar-pei, and any other dog 
determined to be vicious [determined to be vicious 
under subsection B]." 
3 
"F. LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: The dogs identified under 
this Section: 
1. Must be licensed under the procedures and fee 
set forth in this ordinance. 
2. Must be kept in a fenced yard, dog run, or 
other structure which is at least six feet in 
height, by six feet wide, by ten feet in 
length. 
3. Must be on a leash and properly muzzled when 
they are out of a fenced area. 
4. Must, at the time of licensing, provide proof 
of a fully paid homeowners or rental insurance 
policy containing a personal liability clause 
in the amount of $100,000. 
5. The insurance policy, agent and number will be 
recorded upon licensing, and the agent will be 
notified if the dog is cited for violating this 
chapter. 
6. These requirements must be met before a dog 
license will be issued." 
Subsequently, the matter came before the trial court in a non-
jury trial, on January 12, 13, and 27, 1989. Prior to the time of 
trial, Ralph Greenwood passed away and his name was deleted as a 
party, his daughter Kate Greenwood replaced him as President of 
American Dog Breeders Association, which was also noted at trial. 
At trial of this matter, multiple witnesses were brought forward 
to testify on behalf of each party. 
As a result of said hearings before the Court, the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page issued a Memorandum Decision in this case on May 8, 
1989. The Court held that the ordinance provision defining a 
4 
vicious animal as "any animal by its unique nature or breed which 
has known propensities to be aggressive towards any person or 
animal", was vague and overbroad, and thus unconstitutional. The 
Court further concluded there was no basis in law or fact for 
finding that the ordinance constituted an unlawful taking. The 
Court then went on to find that the remainder of the ordinance was 
constitutionally valid as to the equal protection and due process 
challenges. 
Pursuant to the Courtfs requirement, Counsel for North Salt 
Lake duly prepared Findings of Fact and Judgment, the final and 
approved copies of which were entered in the court's file on July 
14, 1989. It is from these Findings of Fact (Exhibit B) and 
Judgment that Greenwoods now appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony at trial, relevant to issues herein presented, is 
as follows: 
With regards to vagueness, as to visual identification of a 
breed, North Salt Lake City produced evidence that the typical 
animal control method of breed determination is visual observation 
of a particular dog. Record, Day 1, at 24. However, this same 
witness, who is charged with enforcement of this ordinance, is 
aware that on cross-breed dogs, this visual observation is only as 
accurate in determining specific breed make-up as to which 
characteristics are dominant in the animal. Record, day 1 at 34. 
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Other witnesses also testified as to visual observation being part 
of determination, but by no means an exclusive and comprehensive 
test. Record, day 1, at 46, 47. That is, if the particular dog 
fits in with the breed standard as published by any given dog 
registry it is somewhat helpful to determine the breed. Record, 
day 3, at 61. 
Facts relied upon to show arbitrariness, and thus vagueness 
include testimony from the North Salt Lake Animal Control Director 
that the wording of the statute, "not limited to" would allow 
enforcing officers to include any dog under the umbrella of the 
ordinance if they wanted to. Record, day 3, at 107. 
Further arbitrariness in application was testified to by a 
couple of witnesses with regard to factors of heredity versus 
factors of training as to propensity of a dog to be vicious. Such 
testimony clearly shows that training is the operative factor in 
determining a dog's behavior (i.e., propensity for viciousness) . 
Record, day 2, 50-51, 52, 58, 62-63, 67, 74, 103; day 3, at 23, 25, 
48. There is also basis for showing some tendency to be aggressive 
can be bred for, but only in individual dog cases, not as extending 
to the entire breed. Record, day 2, at 63; day 3, at 65. 
Much testimony was elicited at trial regarding the only valid 
determination of breed is by having a dog's registration papers or 
pedigree charts. Record, day 1, at 151, 247; day 2 at 30; day 3, 
at 15. By stipulation, there is no scientific method by which the 
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breed of any particular dog can be determined. Record, day 1, at 
44. 
Finally, the only expert testimony with regards to animal 
behavioralism, was to effect that classification of a breed of dog 
as vicious based on unique hereditary characteristics is an 
arbitrary classification and not founded upon scientific knowledge 
of behavior of dogs. Record, day 2, at 71-72. 
Facts relative to substantive due process fall into three (3) 
general areas. The first is the classification of certain breeds 
of dog as inherently vicious. Testimony at trial was that all 
dogs, regardless of breed, have a propensity to be aggressive. 
Record, day 2, at 47; day 3, at 62. There was no testimony that 
any breed of dog is inherently vicious, or has unique hereditary 
characteristics of a propensity to be vicious. In fact, the only 
testimony touching on this important concern was that of 
Greenwoods1 animal behavioralist who testified to the effect that 
no breed of dog has propensity to be any more vicious than another 
breed of dog. Record, dog 2, at 52, 62-63. He further testified 
to the effect that no breed exhibits more aggressions than any 
other breed on a breed to breed comparison. Record, day 2, at 71. 
The second general factual area relevant to substantive due 
process is as to the objective sought by the legislation. 
Testimony of a council woman brought out concerns of her 
constituency about dogs scaring and biting people in her 
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neighborhood. She sought legislation to give safety to the 
citizens and to preserve the neighborhood's quality of life. 
Record, day 2, at 129. However, on direct examination when asked 
whether the breeds specified in the ordinance, in her view, 
possessed a threat or were particularly dangerous to the citizens 
of North Salt Lake, she unqualifiedly answered, "No." Record, day 
2, at 130. 
The third general area of substantive due process relevance 
are factors regarding the narrow classification of the seven (7) 
specified breeds as inherently vicious. All records as produced 
by the animal control director as far as bites per dog registered 
with the city and actual dog bite reports are incomplete and/or 
inconclusive as to providing lines of demarcation between 
inherently vicious breeds and "other" breeds. The records of bites 
per dog registered is of no comparative value. Bites per breed of 
other dogs had not been computed to show any greater danger. 
Record, day 3, at 95-98. As far as dog bite incident reports, all 
as were brought forth at trial depicted a remarkably average-type 
bite for any dog — a puncture wound. Record, day 3, at 78, 80, 
85, 87. 
Facts previously set forth apply to the equal protection 
argument hereunder. The only further fact of noteworthiness is 
testimony that all dogs will bite, and that is what ought to be 
controlled - the actual number of bites. Record, day 3, at 28-29. 
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Facts also previously set forth, supra, show indisputably that 
registration papers or pedigree charts are the only valid and 
reliable means of breed identification. Especially in attempting 
to determine cross-breeds, visual determination breaks down and is 
an unreliable means to determine breed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
North Salt Lake City Ordinance, Section 13-20-16E is 
violative of due process because it is impermissibly vague. Such 
vagueness arises from the ordinances1 inadequate notice to the 
average dog-owner of an unregistered or mixed-breed dog whether the 
ordinance is controlling of the licensing of this type of animal. 
It is further vague in its failure to set up clear guidelines by 
which animal control officers can objectively apply the ordinance. 
The only factors as set forth in the ordinance involve subjective 
matters of ownership training or instruction and do not deal with 
objective matters specific to a breed of dog. The ordinance is 
also vague and arbitrary by its wording, "include, but are not 
limited to," which gives total discretion to the enforcement agency 
as to what dogs fall under this ordinance. Furthermore, there is 
not evidence showing anything remarkably unique about the 
ordinance-specified breeds as compared to all other breeds in North 
Salt Lake City as far as incidents of biting or types of wounds 
inflicted. 
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The ordinance in question does not apply equally to all 
persons within the class of owners of dogs. The ordinance is 
overbroad in that it regulates all owners of all specified breeds 
despite substantial evidence that a propensity for viciousness is 
not a breed specific trait. The ordinance is under-inclusive in 
regulating only a few breeds of dogs where substantial evidence 
shows all breeds, including mixed-breeds contain dogs that bite, 
and dogs that may seem to have propensity to be vicious. The 
ordinance undoubtedly seeks to protect public health and welfare 
against dog bites and attacks, but the discriminatory 
classifications in this ordinance do not further this objective. 
The trial court made a specific finding that where 
registration was not available, the breed of hte dog could be 
determined by its predominant physical characteristics. Evidence 
produced at trial does not substantiate this finding. Evidence at 
trial merely stated to the effect that if an animal fit within the 
characteristics of an ideal member of the breed, then its breed 
could be determined by visual observation of predominant physical 
characteristics. However, evidence further shows that many members 
of a breed do not fit the physically ideal standard of hte breed 
and so cannot be classified visually. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING NORTH SALT 
LAKE CITY ORDINANCE, SECTION 13-20-16E, WAS NOT VAGUE 
AND VIOLATIVE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AS MEASURED BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS. 
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A. The Ordinance is impermissibly vague. The key Supreme 
Court case discussing vagueness and its elements is Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The Court has said in Grayned. 
at 108-109, that: 
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment 
is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly 
defined. Vague laws offend several important values. 
First, because we assume that man is free to steer 
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws 
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may 
act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must 
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A 
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters 
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application. [Footnotes 
omitted]. 
Greenwoods contend that North Salt Lakefs breed specific 
vicious dog legislation, North Salt Lake City Animal Control 
Ordinance, Section 13-20-16E, is lacking in terms susceptible of 
objective measurement as it applies to them and their dogs of 
unknown origins, as well as being generally vague as applied to 
other dog owners within the cityfs jurisdiction. 
The basis of due process, as broken down by Grayned, supra, 
applies in the instant matter as follows: 
1. INADEQUATE NOTICE. 
In accord with the first basic principle of due process 
elicited from Gravned. supra Greenwoods contend that the ordinance 
fails to give fair and adequate notice. The ordinance, by stating 
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vicious dogs "include, but are not limited to" the specified 
breeds, does not give the average person of ordinary intelligence 
a reasonable opportunity to know what breeds are actually covered 
by the ordinance, so that he may act accordingly to conform with 
the requirements. 
Owners of unregistered dogs or mixed breed dogs have no means 
or ways of knowing whether their dog is one of the breeds listed 
and whether they can or should comply with licensing requirements. 
Greenwoods do not question North Salt Lake's authority to take 
proper measures to safeguard the public from vicious animals. 
However, the particular methods employed by North Salt Lake must 
allow Greenwoods, and other citizens similarly situated, to know 
what is, and what is not, a vicious animal. With regard to breed 
registered dogs the ordinance gives some notice, but as to dogs 
sharing some predominant characteristics with the specified breeds 
the ordinance lacks clarity. North Salt Lake would have us believe 
that each and every dog of a breed can be identified by visual 
perception. However, Greenwoods, who are involved in the dog 
business, are aware of many purebreeds which do not conform to 
standards for such breeds in the sharing of predominant 
characteristics. This factor of uncertainty in all cases was shown 
forth at trial through many knowledgeable witnesses. Extrapolating 
from this knowledge of purebreeds, it becomes apparent that many 
unregistered and mixed breed dogs likely have few, if any, 
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predominant characteristics of the specified breeds, but under the 
ordinance, would still need to comply with special provisions 
listed therein. Conversely, owners of unregistered and mixed-breed 
dogs that are not of the specified breeds but have certain physical 
features of the specified breeds will not know whether they must 
comply or not. The vagueness here arises where an owner of an 
unregistered or mixed breed dog is not aware he has ownership of 
a dog falling under purview of this ordinance. Effectively, the 
owner does not know whether he must comply. If he does not comply 
and the Animal Control Department determines the ordinance is 
applicable; whose determination is applicable as to the effect of 
the ordinance, Animal Control's or the dog ownerfs? On one hand, 
the citizen owner of a mixed breed has no notice he must comply 
with the ordinance; on the other hand, no objective standard is set 
whereby the Animal Control Department can objectively determine 
whether the owner has or should comply. 
2. ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT. 
The second element of procedural due process with respect to 
vagueness is that due process "requires legislatures to set 
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and 
triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." [Footnote omitted]. Smith v. Goauen. 415 U.S. 566, 
572-573 (1974). 
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The Supreme Court set forth the standard, in Baaaett v. 
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366-367 (1964), for invalidating a state 
statute because of vagueness: 
because . . . [the statutory provision] was lacking in 
"terms susceptible of objective measurement" and failed 
to inform as to what the State commanded or forbade. The 
statute therefore fell within the compass of those 
decisions of the Court holding that a law forbidding or 
requiring conduct in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application violates due process of law. 
[Citations omitted]. 
North Salt Lakefs ordinance is not set up around reasonably 
clear guidelines, by which animal control enforcement officers, the 
City Manager, or triers of fact can objectively determine the 
extent and applications of the ordinance. 
The ordinance allows for unlimited induction of any breed of 
dog under the purview of the ordinance as was testified to by North 
Salt Lake's Animal Control Director. Further, Greenwoods contend 
and evidence at trial has shown that there are no objective 
guidelines or standards for determining a hereditary characteristic 
of propensity for viciousness. A propensity for viciousness mostly 
is determined by training, a very subjective factor not related to 
breed at all. There are also no objective legislated guidelines 
for determining breeds of dogs. The only dogs and dog owners which 
this law can be enforced against, in an objective manner, absent 
the requirement of constitutional equal protection and the 
requirement of delineating of properly legislated classifications, 
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would be registered dogs of a specified breed certain, on which dog 
the animal control department and the dog owner had the 
registration papers. The registration papers, evincing a dog's 
genealogy, are the only reasonably accurate means of determining 
a particular dog's breed membership. No other methods, 
observations, or perceptions exist whereby breed can, accurately 
and without great subjectivity, be determined. 
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), 
the Supreme Court of the United States found a city vagrancy 
ordinance void for vagueness in commenting that: 
[w]here, as here, there are no standards governing the 
exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the 
scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a 
convenient tool for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement 
by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups 
deemed to merit their displeasure." [Citation omitted]. 
Id, at 170. This same comment holds true regarding the North Salt 
Lake City vicious dog ordinance, inasmuch as the Defendants 
ordinance sets no standards for an objective determination of 
either breed of a dog or even parameters of what constitutes 
viciousness. 
The ordinance is indefinite in application. This 
indefiniteness is illustrated by the wording of the ordinance 
wherein it states: 
HEREDITARY CHARACTERISTICS: There are certain breeds 
of dogs which by their unique hereditary characteristics, 
owner training and instruction, or through mistreatment 
have a propensity to be vicious. These breeds include, 
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but are not limited to, . . .[Emphasis Added! 
North Salt Lake Animal Control Ordinance 13-20-16E. 
The phrases, "unique hereditary characteristics" and "include, 
but are not limited to" result in much of the vagueness about this 
ordinance in its notice to owners and its practical application. 
First, the phrase "unique hereditary characteristics" 
presupposes that each and every owner of each and every dog within 
the jurisdiction of North Salt Lake City knows the ancestry of the 
dog he owns, as well as any and all hereditary characteristics 
which may run through the breed or breeds involved. The ability 
to know the ancestry of many dogs falling under this ordinance is 
a practical impossibility. Generally, the only owners who are 
reasonably certain of their dog's ancestry are those who own a dog 
registered with one of the dog registries wherein knowledge of 
ancestry is the key to being able to register. Such registered 
animals rarely are the problem animals involved in attacks. 
Registered animals are more expensive, and usually are valued show 
or "contest" dogs who are very well-behaved, especially around 
strange people, due to their training. 
Second, the phrase "include, but are not limited to," could 
reasonably be interpreted to mean that the ordinance applies to 
all breeds of dogs in the city, a few other breeds of dogs in the 
city, or no other breeds of dogs in the city. This particular 
phraseology in the ordinance allows for no definite construction 
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whereby an owner of a dog, whether he knows the breed thereof or 
not, can be sure he is or must be in full compliance in licensing 
and keeping his dog in North Salt Lake City. 
B. The Ordinance is violative of Substantive Due 
Process. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant has authority to 
regulate dogs. That power is specifically given to cities under 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-65, 1953 as amended. However, 
the Defendant must comply with constitutional aspects in the use 
of that regulatory power. In this instance, Defendant has sought 
to regulate specific breeds of dogs which it terms as hereditarily 
vicious, but the wording of that ordinance does not specifically 
limit the inherently vicious breeds to those so named or specified. 
This legislation is violative of substantive due process in two 
respects. 
First, absent any scientific evidence that the specified 
breeds, i.e., Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier, 
Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, American Pit 
Bull Terrier, Tosa and Shar-pei, have unique hereditary 
characteristics giving them propensity to be vicious as a breed of 
dog, the classification of these specified breeds as inherently 
"vicious" is clearly an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. 
Furthermore, the singling out of these named breeds does not bear 
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. 
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The object of the legislation is, or at least ought to be, to 
prevent dog attacks or dog bites by any dog of any breed within 
North Salt Lake City's boundaries. The fundamental basis for 
regulatory legislation is to protect the health, safety and welfare 
of the citizenry. The singling out of the named breeds in 
Defendant's ordinance is not fairly and substantially related to 
the protection of citizens' welfare. Defendant does not, and 
cannot, show that these named breeds have inflicted more injury or 
duress on the citizens of North Salt Lake. If anything, other 
breeds of dogs and mixed breeds of dogs have inflicted much more 
injury, damage and duress, and are more numerous; yet are not named 
or otherwise affected directly by this ordinance. If the ordinance 
were fair and substantially related to protection of the citizenry, 
it would specify those other injurious and damaging breeds as being 
inherently vicious as well. 
Second, the ordinance also goes further to state that 
hereditary characteristics are not limited to the specifically 
named breeds but may be, and are to be, determined to be vicious 
by subjective standards of owner, training, and instruction, or 
mistreatment. This classification is also of an arbitrary nature 
in that owner, training, instruction or mistreatment are not 
defined by an objective test nor is the decision maker who will 
apply this standard set forth. This subjective classification is 
also clearly arbitrary and has no grounds as a fair and substantial 
18 
relation to the object of legislation, so that those of similar 
circumstances have an expectation of being treated alike. It is 
obviously not the case that only the specified breeds have 
behavioral problems as results of their owner, his training or his 
mistreatment. These factors affect all dogs wherever located. 
Because of the subjectivity involved in classifying dogs as vicious 
or not in the context of owner training, instruction, or 
mistreatment, the enforcement officers have too much discretion, 
thereby creating another constitutional infirmity in this 
ordinance. 
The seminal case on this point of constitutional law is 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). In that case 
the Supreme Court set forth the standard whereby States may resort 
to classification for purposes of legislation. The Court stated: 
"But the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must 
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id, at 415. 
In Royster, legislation was challenged which taxed domestic 
corporations transacting business, both within the State of 
Virginia, and beyond the boundaries of that state, on the aggregate 
income of such business transacted, while not placing the burden 
of taxation on domestically incorporated businesses that did not 
transact business within the State. In determining that the effect 
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of the legislation was to only assess taxes on corporations 
actively involved in the State, so that by taxing only them, these 
corporations would be less likely to incorporate elsewhere, the 
Court found that: 
It is obvious that the ground of difference upon which 
the discrimination is rested has no fair or substantial 
relation to the proper object sought to be accomplished 
by the legislation. It follows that it is arbitrary in 
effect; [Emphasis added]» 
Royster Guano Co. at 416. 
In the instant case, North Salt Lake's exercise of police 
power in regulating specified breeds as vicious dogs, bears no fair 
or substantial relation to the objective of protecting the citizens 
and visitors of North Salt Lake City from all dog attacks and 
bites. Any dog can attack and/or bite, such actions are not the 
result of unique hereditary characteristics and do not lend 
themselves to specific breed classifications. 
Based on the foregoing, Greenwoods contend that there is no 
substantial rational connection between the ordinance's regulation 
of specific breeds and the promotion of safety of persons and 
property. 
II. THE ORDINANCE IS DISCRIMINATORY AND VIOLATES 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND IS VIOLATIVE OF 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Greenwoods contend that the North Salt Lake Animal Control 
Ordinance is discriminatory and violative of equal protection of 
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the laws as guaranteed by the Utah State Constitution and the 
United States Constitution. Summarily the standard for equal 
protection is: 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." The Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution prohibits the states from enacting 
laws that deny "any person within its jurisdiction equal 
protection of the laws." Although their language is 
dissimilar, these provisions embody the same general 
principle: persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should 
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same. 
[Footnote and citations omitted]. 
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). 
Malan, at 670, goes on to define the protection offered by the 
Utah Constitution: 
Article I, section 24 protects against two types of 
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class, [citation omitted]. Second, the 
statutory classifications and the different treatment 
given the classes must be based on differences that have 
a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute. [citations omitted]. 
In the instant case, the ordinance does not apply equally to 
all persons within a class. In the class of owners of dogs, 
specific breeds are singled out based on either unidentifiable 
factors or highly subjective factors. Also, owners of unregistered 
dogs may easily be treated differently, and less or more 
stringently, than owners of registered dogs, given the fact that 
registration documents are the only reasonably accurate means for 
determination of a breed. 
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Basically, it is that, North Salt Lake's ordinance violates 
provisions of the equal protection of laws as guaranteed under the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and Utah 
State constitution, Article I, Section 24, for being both overbroad 
and underinclusive. 
1. The North Salt Lake Ordinance is Overbroad in 
Application. 
The ordinance is overbroad in that it regulates all owners of 
dogs of all the named breeds—the Bull Terrier, the American 
Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire Bull 
Terrier, American Pit Bull Terrier, Tosa, Shar-pei— as vicious 
dogs, despite substantial evidence that viciousness is not a 
specific breed characteristic. Evidence at trial has shown that 
viciousness can, and does, occur in any breed of dog. As 
corollary to that showing, most dogs within the classifications of 
the ordinance do not exhibit vicious characteristics or tendencies. 
Therefore, this ordinance is unnecessarily broad in its regulation 
inasmuch as it regulates owners of non-vicious dogs as though their 
dogs were vicious. 
2. The North Salt Lake Ordinance is Underinclusive. 
The ordinance is also underinclusive. This underinclusion 
arises from North Salt Lake's regulation of owners of only a few 
breeds of dogs, where substantial evidence shows all breeds, 
including mixed-breeds, contain vicious dogs. All breeds of dogs 
are capable of biting, killing, and being vicious. By singling 
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out only seven (7) breeds for special regulation, North Salt Lake 
has failed to include breeds of dogs that include biters and 
vicious dogs, i.e., German Shepherds, Doberman Pinschers, Chow-
Chows, etc. This underinclusion substantially burdens owners of 
dogs specified in the ordinance, while allowing owners of dogs, not 
so listed, to escape this stringent regulation although their dog 
belongs to a breed which statistically outranks the specified 
breeds in bite statistics data. 
The ordinance classifications and the different treatments 
given the classes are not based on differences having a tendency 
to further the objectives of the ordinance. The ordinance, 
undoubtedly, seeks to protect public health and welfare against dog 
bites and attacks. It is a fact that all dogs can and do bite. 
This biting or tendency to bite, is not breed specific, it is not 
a "breed" problem, it is an "owner's" problem. Substantial 
evidence has been produced that viciousness is not a hereditary 
characteristic but that it is a learned behavior. All dogs are 
capable of learning good or bad behavior, that too is not breed 
specific. 
In order to further the objectives of the ordinance, the 
legislation should cover only owners of dogs whose dogs have 
behavioral problems giving them a propensity to bite and/or attack. 
This objective is not furthered by naming specific breeds. There 
is no scientific evidence relating behavioral problems to breeds. 
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Rather behavioral problems are dog specific, based on the 
individual dogfs personality, treatment and instruction. 
Because the ordinance does not apply equally to dogs and 
owners of dogs within the specified classes, by singling out the 
ideal registered standard of the breed for special legislation, and 
also because the differential treatment given the classes does not 
further the objective of the ordinance by protecting the public's 
health and welfare from all dog bites and attacks, regardless of 
breed, the ordinance violates equal protection of the laws. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT PREDOMINANT PHYSICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS ARE DETERMINATIVE OF BREED 
DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE SPECIES OF DOG. 
The trial court herein made a specific finding that the breed 
of a dog is determined by registration or by predominant physical 
characteristics. It is a recognized fact by Experts in the 
breeding field that breed of dog is determined by registration and 
pedigree. The basic issue herein is whether facts produced at 
trial allow for a finding of fact that breed can be determined by 
predominant physical characteristics? It cannot. 
By the very definition of "Findings of Fact", such findings 
are made based on evidence adduced at trial. These are to be the 
facts as found to exist in the particular matter by the trial 
court. It should be noted that evidence produced at trial as 
concerns breed identification came from all expert witnesses on 
both sides of the case. Even at that, determination of breed by 
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examination only of predominant physical characteristics was 
admittedly only guesswork. There was no assuredness, nor certainty 
of identification. Also, such visual observation only works on 
dogs fitting certain standards, it is wholly ineffective as to dogs 
of certain breeds not fitting the ideal standard of that breed. 
Our standards of law, by which such identification should be 
judged, however, calls for reason to know of the particular breed 
by the average, common citizen, not an animal expert. Therefore, 
by a preponderance of evidence, the lack of certainty by experts 
as to determining breed by predominant physical characteristics 
should be recognized. The trial court should have found breed 
identification only by use of registration and pedigree charts as 
such are the only objective method of accurate breed determination. 
Arguendo, even if experts could determine the breed of a 
particular dog by its physical characteristics, the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to all citizens rather than to only experts in 
a particular field. Evidence on the record clearly demonstrates 
that the average citizen-dog owner could not, with that degree of 
certainty required by the Fourteenth Amendment, identify the breed 
of a particular dog simply by its physical characteristics. The 
evidence on the record demonstrates that most experts cannot 
identify the breed of a particular dog by its physical 
characteristics. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, to wit: that the trial 
court erred in finding the ordinance was not void for vagueness 
and violative of due process; that the ordinance is discriminatory 
and violative of equal protection of hte laws; and that the trial 
court erred in finding as a fact that breed can be determined by 
predominant physical characteristics where registration is 
unavailable; the Plaintiff-Appellants respectfully request a 
determination of this court that based upon the record and evidence 
in this matter, North Salt Lake City Ordinance 13-20-16E is vague 
in its application and therefore void, is violative of due process 
and equal protection of hte laws, and therefore should be stricken, 
and is not based upon substantiated findings of fact in the trial 
court, which would support the conclusion of constitutionality. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants request this case be remanded to the District 
Court with appropriate instructions, or in the alternative, be 
dismissed. 
DATED this ^22. day of November, 1989. 
David Paul White 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
26 
EXHIBIT A 
Section 13-20-16: 
"A. PREMISES, MUZZLE: It shall be unlawful for the 
owner of any fierce, dangerous, or vicious animal 
to permit such animal to go or be off the premises 
of the owner unless such animal is under restraint 
and properly muzzled as to prevent it from injuring 
any person or property.M 
ME. HEREDITY CHARACTERISTICS: Certain breeds of dogs 
which by their unique hereditary characteristics, 
owner, training, and instruction, or mistreatment 
has a propensity to be vicious* These breeds 
include, but are not limited to, the Bull Terrier, 
the American Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire 
Terrier, Staffordshire [sic] Bull Terrier, American 
Pit Bull Terrier, Tosa, Shar-pei, and any other dog 
determined to be vicious [determined to be vicious 
under subsection B].M 
MF. LICENSING REQUIREMENTS: The dogs identified under 
this Section: 
1. Must be licensed under the procedures and fee 
set forth in this ordinance, 
2. Must be kept in a fenced yard, dog run, or 
other structure which is at least-six feet in 
height, by six feet wide, by ten feet in 
length. 
3. Must be on a leash and properly muzzled when 
they are out of a fenced area. 
4. Must, at the time of licensing, provide proof 
of a fully paid homeowners or rental insurance 
policy containing a personal liability clause 
in the amount of $100,000. 
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Attorneys for Defendant, 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
KATE GREENWOOD, et al.# ) 
Plaintiffs, ) FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
CITY OF NORTH SALT LAKE, an ) Civil No. 40876 
incorporated Municipality, ) Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendants. ) 
This matter came on regularly before the court for 
a non-jury trial, on January 12, 13, and 27, 1989, the 
Honorable Rodney S. Page, Utah State District Judge, 
presiding: David Paul White appearing for the plaintiffs, 
Kate Greenwood, Andrew Greenwood, and the American Dog 
Breeders Association (hereinafter "Greenwood"); Kent L. 
Christiansen of Mueller & Christiansen, appearing for the 
defendant City of North Salt Lake (hereinafter "North Salt 
Lake19); and the parties having adduced evidence by way of 
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testimony and documentary exhibits and having argued the 
matter to the court, and the court having reviewed the file 
exhibits and memoranda submitted by the parties and being 
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, now, 
therefore, the court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Certain of the plaintiffs reside within the 
City of North Salt Lake. 
2. Said residents own dogs of the breed known as 
the American Pit Bull Terrier. 
3. That plaintiffs own a kennel in North Salt 
Lake which raises, breeds, boards and sells dogs of the 
American Pit Bull Terrier breed. 
4. The plaintiff, Kate Greenwood, is president of 
the American Dog Breeders Association, which has its 
principal office in North Salt Lake and which recognized and 
registers the American Pit Bull Terrier breed. 
5. MPit bullM is a generic term generally 
referring to breeds made up of the Bull Terrier, American 
Staffordshire Terrier, Staffordshire, Bull Terrier and the 
American Pit Bull Terrier and when the Court uses the term 
"pit bull91 it uses it in its generic sense. 
6. The American Staffordshire Terrier and the 
American Pit Bull Terrier are generally recognized as the 
same breed. 
7. The most generally accepted association for 
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registering and classifying dogs in the United States is the 
American Kennel Club or AKC as it is commonly known. 
8. The AKC recognizes three breeds of wpit 
bulls": The American Staffordshire Terrier# the Bull 
Terrier, and the Staffordshire Bull Terrier. 
9. The breed of a dog is determined by 
registration or by predominant physical characteristics. 
10. To be registered, a dog must possess the 
predominant physical characteristics of the particular breed 
as set by the registering association. 
11. There is no scientific method for determining 
a dog's breed such as blood test, x-rays or scientific tests. 
12. The combination of predominant physical 
characteristics determine the dog's breed. 
13. The breed of most dogs can be determined by 
visual inspection of the particular dog's predominant 
physical characteristics. 
14. All of the Hpit bull19 breeds manifest unique 
physical characteristics of the breed generally so that they 
are easily discernible from other breeds. 
15. The Npit bull91 breeds are known for their 
unique combination of proportionate strength, agility, 
aggressiveness, courage, intelligence, high tolerance for 
pain, tenacity and gameness. 
16. The "pit bull" breeds were historically bred 
exclusively for fighting and killing other animals; namely, 
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other dogs. 
17. North Salt Lake City is primarily a 
residential community. 
18. North Salt Lake City has experienced over the 
years a number of bites and attacks by "pit bulls19. These 
bites and attacks are substantially higher among Hpit bull" 
breeds than any other breed given the proportionate number of 
Mpit bulls" in the City's dog population* 
19. "Pit bulls" have killed other dogs, attacked 
people and on one occasion attempted on numerous occasions to 
attack humans through a glass door. 
20. In Salt Lake City, a neighboring community, in 
1988 there were 295 dog bites; 28 were from "pit bull". The 
only breed with more bites in total number was the German 
Shepherd of which there were five or six times as many as 
"pit bulls" in the dog population. 
21. Bites by "pit bulls" in Salt Lake City were 
proportionately higher than any other breed. 
22. Animal Control treats "pit bulls" differently 
than any other breed: They are kept separate from other dogs 
and behind solid walls where possible; a breaking stick is 
often required to loosen their jaws from the grip of a 
victim; they are treated with more caution than any other 
breed. 
23. Because of the reputation of the "pit bull" 
breeds they are acquired by certain people in order to 
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capitalize on their reputation and natural characteristics 
and make them mean and aggressive. 
24. In 1986, the North Salt Lake City council 
adopted the ordinance herein question. It was amended in 
1987 to add the breed of the American Pit Bull Terrier to the 
breed specific portion of the ordinance and to provide for 
administrative review for those aggrieved by the ordinance. 
25. The City considered the facts set forth above 
concerning the Mpit bull" breeds prior to adopting the 
ordinance. 
26. Among other things, the ordinance categorized 
certain animals as "fierce, dangerous, or vicious animals" in 
terms of certain breeds which by their unique hereditary 
characteristics, owner training and instruction or 
mistreatment had propensity to be vicious. The "pit bull" 
breeds (along with other breeds not at issue here) were 
named. These breeds were made subject to special licensing, 
confinement restrictions and insurance provisions. 
27. The ordinance also defined "vicious animals", 
among other things, as "any animal by its unique nature or 
breeding that has known propensities to be aggressive towards 
any person or animal". 
28. The plaintiffs who own dogs of the "pit bull11 
breed, named and carry on a business concerned with the 
breed, filed this action challenging the constitutionality of 
the provisions in question, 
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29. The plaintiffs1 challenge to the ordinance in 
question center around their claim that it violates the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Nequal 
protection11 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, 
Section XXIV of the Utah Constitution. They further claim 
that the ordinance constitutes an unlawful taking. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
draws the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the evidence adduced at trial requires 
the Court to conclude that plaintiffs have standing to 
challenge the validity of the terms of the ordinance in 
question, in light of the fact that the provisions challenged 
are applicable to them and will be enforced against them. 
2. In reviewing any ordinance or statute to 
ascertain its constitutionality, this Court is bound by 
certain well-settled general rules of construction. 
3. Legislative enactments are endowed with a 
strong presumption of validity, and they should not be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis 
upon which they can be found to come within the 
constitutional framework. 
4. They should not be held unconstitutional 
unless there is a clear and compelling showing that they are 
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision. 
5. The burden of showing invalidity of a 
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legislative enactment is on the one who makes the challenge. 
6. The concept of due process, as guaranteed by 
the U.S. Constitution and our own State Constitution is 
somewhat difficult to define. However, generally it is 
broken down into the concept of substantive due process and 
procedural due process. 
7. Substantive due process generally embodies the 
concept of equal protection and freedom from arbitrary 
action. The essence of substantive due process is 
characterized as Na standard of reasonableness19 which is 
similar to the test of "rational grounds11 used to evaluate 
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
8. Procedural due process revolves around the 
idea of notice, jurisdiction, right of hearing and fairness. 
9. It is also fair to say that the two concepts 
are not completely separate and that certain aspects of each 
intertwine with the other. 
10. In reviewing any legislative act, in light of 
the challenge for violation of due process and equal 
protection, the initial inquiry must be as to whether or not 
the enactment in question seeks to interfere with a 
fundamental right or operates to the particular disadvantage 
of a suspect class. If it does, then the latitude given the 
governmental agency is much reduced and the inquiry of the 
court is one of strict scrutiny. There must be a compelling 
state interest to allow the intrusion or the classification 
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and the means chosen for such intrusion must be the least 
intrusive possible. 
11* On the other hand, if we are not dealing with 
a fundamental right nor a suspect class, the legislative body 
is given much more flexibility and latitude in regulating and 
classifying and the Court1s only inquiry is to determine if 
the object of the enactment concerns a legitimate State 
interest and whether any classification bears a reasonable 
relationship to that objective and whether there is a 
reasonable basis for the distinction between the classes. 
12. The Court does not substitute its opinion for 
that of the legislative body. The Court presumes that the 
local authorities are familiar with local conditions and know 
the needs of the community nor is the Court concerned that 
the same objective may be arrived at by a less intrusive 
manner. 
13. Classifications are not unreasonable or 
arbitrary as long as similar situated people are dealt with 
in a similar manner and people situated differently are not 
treated as if their circumstances were the same. 
14. Classifications need not be applied with 
mathematical exactness. 
15. It is also clear that if a classification is 
not arbitrary and is founded on any substantial distinction 
or apparent natural reason which suggests a necessity or 
propriety of the special legislation, a Court has no right to 
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interfere with the exercise of legislative discretion. 
16. The concept of vagueness is one which involves 
both principles of due process and equal protection. These 
concepts require an enactment to be sufficiently explicit and 
clear so as to inform the ordinary reader of common 
intelligence what conduct is prohibited. There is no 
vagueness when the enactment contains terms which the 
ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can 
understand and comply with. 
17. It is not the Courts duty to indulge in 
conjecture that the ordinance may be so distorted or 
unreasonably applied that some innocent person might come 
within its terms. The Court is required to assume that those 
who administer an ordinance will do so within reason and 
common sense, and in accordance with its language and intent. 
18. If there is a choice as to the manner of its 
interpretation and application, that should be done in a 
manner which will make it constitutional as opposed to one 
which would make it invalid. 
19 • The Court further recognizes that this case 
does not involve any fundamental rights or suspect 
classifications• 
20. One of the major points of contention between 
the parties is one of whether the breed specific provision of 
the ordinance bears a reasonable, rational relationship to 
the objectives sought to be accomplished and whether there is 
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a reasonable basis to specify the Mpit bull" breeds for 
special classification. 
21. The object of the legislation is obvious in 
attempting to specify those breeds of dogs which constitute 
an unreasonably high risk of danger to the public and then in 
requiring certain precautions so as to reduce that risk. 
22. That none of the parties dispute that the 
controlling of vicious animals and the protection of citizens 
therefrom is a legitimate State interest, nor that North Salt 
Lake City has authority to address the same by ordinance. 
23. That based upon the evidence adduced at trial 
the Court concludes that there is a rational basis for the 
North Salt Lake City council to have determined that the Mpit 
bull11 breeds do have a unique combination of inherited traits 
which, when coupled with owner training and instruction or 
mistreatment, cause them to have a greater propensity to be 
vicious. 
24. Further, that based upon the evidence adduced 
at trial, the Court concludes that the breeds of Mpit bull11 
terriers specified in the North Salt Lake City ordinance are 
breeds of such unique physical characteristics that they are 
reasonably distinguishable from other breeds. The 
predominant characteristics of the breed are such that a 
person of ordinary intelligence and common sense would be 
able to ascertain if his particular animal was of the breed 
specified. 
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25. The Court finds that the fact that the 
ordinance was not extended to other breeds similarly situated 
or that it did not extend to all of the evils it could have 
is not a basis for constitutional challenge. 
26. That based upon the evidence adduced at trial 
the Court concludes the designation of "pit bull11 as a class 
and the requirement of special licensing and the compliance 
with special conditions and handling has a reasonable and 
rational relationship with one of the objectives of the 
ordinance, which is to protect the citizens and other animals 
from attack by dogs. 
27. That the plaintiffs1 challenge to the breed 
specific provision of the ordinance on the basis of equal 
protection and due process fail even when exposed to the 
slightly more intensive scrutiny required by the Utah Supreme 
Court under our Constitution in the commercial setting. 
28. That relative to the provision of the 
ordinance, which among other things defines a vicious animal 
as "any animal by its unique nature or breeding which has 
known propensities to be aggressive towards any person or 
animal11, the Court concludes that the said provision is 
vague and overbroad in that it would leave the ordinary 
reader of common intelligence at a loss to determine whether 
his particular animal came within the purview of the 
ordinance and thus could only guess as to its applicability 
to him. Accordingly, said provision fails to meet due 
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process requirements as to definiteness and therefore the 
Court concludes that that portion of the definition of 
vicious animals which define the same in terms of a 
••propensity for aggressiveness as a result of unique nature 
or breeding'1 to be void for vagueness. 
29. Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the 
Court further concludes that plaintiffs1 argument as to the 
unlawful taking is without basis in law or fact and 
rejects the same. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
'{jjtM&A, 
David Paul White 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
RODNEY S. PAGE 
District Court Judge 
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